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We consider a dynamical network model in which two competitors have fixed
and different states, and each normal agent adjusts its state according to a
distributed consensus protocol. The state of each normal agent converges to
a steady value which is a convex combination of the competitors' states, and
is independent of the initial states of agents. This implies that the
competition result is fully determined by the network structure and positions
of competitors in the network. We compute an Influence Matrix (IM) in
which each element characterizing the influence of an agent on another
agent in the network. We use the IM to predict the bias of each normal agent
and thus predict which competitor will win. Furthermore, we compare the IM
criterion with seven node centrality measures to predict the winner. We find
that the competitor with higher Katz Centrality in an undirected network or
higher PageRank in a directed network is much more likely to be the winner.
These findings may shed new light on the role of network structure in
competition and to what extent could competitors adjust network structure
so as to win the competition.
ompetition among a set of competitors for obtaining a maximum
number of votes from other agents in a social network is a both
important and common phenomena in real world. The competitors
could be candidates in numerous leader-selection cases, ranging from head–
election in a small group to president-election in a whole country1. They could
also be those who have different proposals or promote different brands of a
product such as mobile phone and car2. There have also been some researches
on, for example, how the fractions of speakers of several competing languages
C
2evolve in time3 and even how the emerging Bitcoins appear to be a possible
competitor to usual currencies4.
The most well-known model in social dynamics for the competition of species
is the voter model5,6, which has also later on been used for the analysis of
diffusion of innovations and consumption decisions. In its simplest form, each
agent in the voter model holds one of the two states. At each time step, a
randomly selected agent takes the state of one of its neighbors. Over the years,
many modifications and extensions of the original voter model have been
proposed7. Voter-like dynamics on networks with different topologies and the
interplay between topology and dynamics have also been investigated8,9.
However, many of such models, including the voter model, Sznajd model10,11,
Deffuant model12, Hegselmann-Krause model13 and so on have been focused on
whether full consensus can be reached.
A nature way to consider the existence of competitors in a network is to view
them as zealots14,15 or stubborn agents16-18 with fixed and different states. For
example, it is shown that the existence of competing zealots in the voter model
prevents convergence and results in fluctuations in regular lattices14 and
complete graphs15. Competitive dynamics with continuous states in the stochastic
gossip model is investigated in Ref.16, in which long-run disagreements and
persistent fluctuations appear. Influence of network structure and locations of
stubborn agents on the fluctuation of final states in a binary opinion formation
model is studied in Ref. 17. In Ref. 18，given one set of stubborn agents as mis-
informers (agents who spread misinformation), the placement of the other set of
stubborn agents (named information disseminators) is formulated as an
optimization problem.
The question we address in this work is: How do positions of competitors in a
network affect voting outcome? That is, can we predict which competitor will win
3in the sense that majority of agents in the network will eventually support the
competitor? Can we predict which competitor a normal agent will support based
on the network structure? Intuitively, the problem of which competitor will win
should be related to the relative impact of the competitors in a network. How to
characterize the impact or importance of an individual (or even a community) in a
network is a question of great importance and applications in network analysis.
Traditionally, identifying such influential nodes usually relies on concepts of
centralities, including degree (DC), betweenness (BC)19, closeness (CC)20,
eigenvector centrality (EC)21, Katz centrality (KC)22, PageRank (PR)23, and so on.
Recently, a lot of researches have also been focused on identifying influential
nodes in dynamical processes on networks. For example, Kitsak et al. have
argued that there are circumstances in which a node with the highest DC or the
highest BC has little effect, and the most efficient spreaders are those located
within the core of the network as identified by the k-shell decomposition24.
However, till now, we still lack an understanding on which of these measures
could best predict the winner among competitors in a network.
Results
A dynamic model for competition. We consider a directed and weighted network
with N agents and M links. The agent set is denoted as {1,2, , }V N  and the
topology of the network is described by a coupling matrix ( )kl N NA a  : if agent k is
directly influenced by agent l , then there is a link from agent k to agent l and
0kla  ; otherwise, 0kla  . For simplicity, we assume that there are just two
competitors in the network, denoted as agents i and j , which have fixed and
different states as follows:
( ) 1,  ( ) 1,  0i jx t x t t      . (1)
4Every other agent (called normal agent) / { , }k V i j has an initial state randomly
chosen from [+1,-1] and updates its state as follows:
 ( 1) ( ) ( ) ( )
k
k k kl l k
l N
x t x t a x t x t

    , (2)
where ( )kx t is the state of agent k at time t ; the parameter  captures the level of
neighbors’ influence; { | 0}k klN l V a   is the set of neighboring agents of agent k
that can directly influence agent k . Note that Eq. (2) belongs to a set of distributed
consensus protocols, which can be traced back to the classical model of DeGroot25.
However, the existence of competitors in the network prohibits global consensus.
Instead, we have the following convergence result:
Suppose that
1) Each normal agent has a path connecting to at least one competitor;
2) 1max0 D   , where maxD is the largest out-degree of agents in the network.
Then the state of each normal agent will eventually reach a steady value, i.e., as
t ,
1 1( ) ( ) 1norm i jX t X D A
         c c , (3)
where 2NnormX R  represents the state vector of all normal agents, and D , A and
i j  c c can all be derived from the network coupling matrix A . Furthermore, if
(0) [-1, +1]kx  , / { , }k V i j  , then ( ) [-1,  +1]kx t  , 0t  . The detailed analysis can be
found in Methods.
0kx  ( 0kx  ) implies that agent k will finally support competitor i ( j ), and | |kx
corresponds to the degree of supporting. 0kx  implies that agent k will be a neutral
agent which does not support any competitor. Denote
5/{ , }
sgn( )ij k
k V i j
x

  , (4)
where sgn() is the sign function. If 0ij  , then competitor i will win in the sense
that more normal agents will support him; if 0ij  , competitor j will win; if 0ij  ,
the competition ends up with a draw.
An illustration example. Fig. 1 shows the competitive dynamics on three simple
undirected networks which have the same number of agents but different coupling
structures. We take agent 1 and agent 10 as two competitors in each network with
fixed states 1 1x   and 10 1x   . Steady states of normal agents are computed
according to Eq. (3). An red (blue) node represents an agent with positive (negative)
state. The darker the color the larger the absolute value of the state. Nodes with
white color represent neutral agents.
(a)
(b) (c)
Figure 1 | An example of how network structure influences the competition
result. (a) A simple undirected network of 10 agents with each edge of unit weight.
The competition between agent 1 and agent 10 ends up as draw. (b) The network is
derived from (a) by adding one edge between agent 2 and 6, which results in agent
10 being the winner. (c) The network has the same structure as network (a) but with
different edge weights, which leads to agent 1 being the winner.
6For network (a), 1,10 0  , hence the competition ends up as draw. Network (b) is
derived from network (a) by just adding one edge between agents 2 and 6, which
results in 1,10 1   and agent 10 being the winner. By changing weights of edges in
network (a), we get network (c), which leads to 1,10 3  and agent 1 winning the
competition. We can see that both network structure and coupling weights influence
the competition results. In the following, we will focus on unweighted networks in the
sense that the weight of every link in a network is one.
Verification on a real network. To see whether Eqs. (1)-(2) could properly model
competition in real social networks, we test it on a commonly used benchmark model
in social network analysis---the Zachary’s karate club network26 as shown in Fig. 2(a),
which is a network of friendships between 34 members of a karate club at a US
university in the 1970s. Due to the confliction between the manager (agent 34) and
the coach (agent 1), the club finally splits into two communities, centered at the
manager and the coach, respectively, as depicted by the vertical dashed line in Fig.
2(a).
In simulation, we fix the states of agents 1 and agent 34 at +1 and -1,
respectively. The state of every other agent evolves according to Eq. (2). Fig 2(b)
shows the steady states of all agents in the network, in which red agents are
supporters of agent 1 and blue agents are supporters of agent 34. It is surprising to
note that this splitting result completely matches the real situation as shown in Fig.
2(a). Furthermore, Fig. 2(b) also reveals the degree of supporting of each normal
agent, represented by the darkness of the color. For example, agent 9 has the
smallest absolute value of steady state among those supporters of agent 34, which
implies that agent 9 is the weakest supporter of agent 34. This is also consistent with
the reality that individual 9 is indeed the weakest political supporter of the manager26.
Therefore, although our model is a very simplified version of the very complex real-
world competition, it might be a reasonable mechanism for the competitive dynamics
in some real social networks. Note that many network community detection methods
7can correctly reveal the two communities in the karate network27, however, they do
not explicitly use the information of the two competitors in the network and cannot
reveal the degree of supporting of each agent towards the corresponding competitor.
(a)
(b)
Figure 2 | Verification of the model on Zachary’s karate club network. (a) Two
real communities in the network led by agent 1 and agent 34, respectively, as divided
by the dashed line in the figure. (b) Two communities derived from our model. Red
community consists of supporters of agent 1 and blue community consists of
supporters of agent 34. Darkness of the color represents the degree of supporting.
Influence Matrix Criterion. From the steady states expression in Eq. (3),
competition results are fully determined by network structure and positions of the
8competitors in the network. However, directly computing the steady states according
to Eq. (3) is computational inefficient for large-scale networks, since for every
different pair of competitors, we have to re-compute the steady states. In the
following, we compute the Influence Matrix (IM), in which each element characterizes
the impact of one agent on another. Note that if there is a link from agent k to l , i.e.,
1kla  , then agent l has a direct impact on agent k . If there is a link from agents k
to m , and a link from agent m to l , then agent l has an indirect impact on agent k
via agent m . Intuitively, such an indirect impact should be weaker than the direct
impact. Taking into account the fact that the number of paths of length r from agent
k to l is ( )r klA in the unweighted network case, we define IM as a sum of the
exponentially decreasing impact of increasingly paths:
2 2F I A A     (5)
where (0,  1)  is an attenuation factor. If 11(0,  )   , where 1 is the largest
eigenvalue of matrix A , then the above series converges28 and we have:
1( )F I A   . (6)
Let kif be the entry of F on k th row and i th column. Denote
/{ , }
( )ij ki kj
k V i j
sgn f f

  , (7)
We have the following IM criterion:
 Which competitor will a normal agent support: If ki kjf f ( ki kjf f ), then
agent k will support competitor i ( j ); If ki kjf f , then agent k is a neutral
agent;
 Which competitor will win: If 0ij  ( 0ij  ), then competitor i ( j ) will
win; If 0ij  , the competition ends up with a draw.
9Although different choice of  in Eq. (7) may generally result in different IM, we
find that the IM criterion is robust with respect to  , in the sense that the criterion
gives similar qualitative prediction for different choice of 1 11 1[0.5 , 0.9 )    (see
Supplementary Figure S1). In the following simulations, we set 110.85   .
Who will you support, and who will win from IM criterion. For the Zachary’s
karate club network, Fig. 3 shows the difference ,1 ,34k kf f between the influences of
two competitors (agent 1 and agent 34) on a normal agent k . Comparing Fig. 3 with
Fig. 2(b), we can see that ,1 ,34 0k kf f  ( ,1 ,34 0k kf f  ) if and only if 0kx  ( 0kx  ),
which implies that the competition result can be fully predicted by the IM criterion in
this case.
Figure 3 | Application of the IM criterion to Zachary’s karate club network.
Agent 1 and agent 34 are two competitors. A normal agent is colored red (blue) if the
influence difference 1 34 0k kf f  ( 1 34 0k kf f  ). We dye all the nodes according to their
normalized difference. The darker the color the larger the absolute difference is.
In general, for a given pair of competitors i and j in a network, we use the IM
criterion to predict the bias of each normal agent and calculate the success rate of
prediction as follows:
 
/ ( , )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) +g ( ) ( )1
( 2) 2
ik jk k ik jk k ik jk k
ij
k V i j
sgn f f sgn x sgn f f sgn x sgn f f sgn x
N 
    
  , (8)
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where ( ) 2g x  , if  0x  ; otherwise ( ) 0g x  . The average success rate of prediction
on the bias of normal agents over all the ( 1) / 2N N  possible pairs of competitors in a
network is denoted as   . Similarly, the success rate of prediction on who will win
as the fraction of correct prediction over all the possible pairs of competitors can be
formulated as follows:
 
,
1 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) +g ( ) ( )( 1) ij ij ij ij ij iji j
sgn sgn sgn sgn sgn sgnN N          . (9)
Table I shows the value of   and  for 15 real social networks. The maximum
value of   is 91.6%, the minimum is 74.0% and the average is 83.6%.  is
almost always larger than 80%: the maximum is 96.9%, the minimum is 79.9% and
the average is 86.0%. These results verify the validity of the IM criterion. We
conjecture through simulation that for most pairs of competitors the prediction of a
normal agent's bias being incorrect is because two competitors have very similar
influence on the normal agent (see Supplementary Figure S2).
Comparison with centrality-based criteria. Given a pair of competitors, we can
predict which competitor will win by the IM criterion. Intuitively, the winner should be
more important or have higher impact on the network than the loser. Over the years,
a number of centrality measures have been proposed to characterize the “importance”
or “impact” of a node in a network. However, one difficulty in applying these
centrality measures is that it is often unclear which of the many measures should be
used in a particular circumstance. Here, we compare the IM criterion with criteria
based on several common-used node centrality measures, including betweeness (BC),
closeness (CC), degree (DC), eigenvector (EC), Katz (KC), K-Shell (KS) and PageRank
(PR) (see Methods for the computation of these measures).
Centrality-based criterion: The competitor with higher centrality value will win.
Competitors with the same centrality value will end up with a draw.
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For each criterion, we calculate the success rate of prediction as the fraction of
correct prediction of who will win over all ( 1) / 2N N  possible pairs of competitors. Fig.
4 and Fig. 5 show the success rate of prediction for 8 real undirected networks and 7
real directed networks, respectively. According to the average success rate over
undirected and directed networks, we have the following order:
 For undirected networks: KC (84.8%), IM (84.4%), EC(79.7%), PR (78.4%), DC
(77.8%), BC (69.4%), KS (61.4%), CC (39.6%).
 For directed networks: PR (93.0%), KC (88.3%), IM (88.0%), EC(87.0%), DC
(79.8%), BC (77.3%), KS (61.0%), CC (37.5%).
We can see that criteria based on KC, PR, IM and EC are always better than the
criteria based on the other four centralities. For undirected networks, KC criterion has
the best performance: It provides highest success rate of prediction in 5 of 8
networks. On the other hand, PR criterion is always the best for each of the 7 directed
networks. From the definition of KC, PR and EC, these results imply that whether a
competitor could win depends to a large extent on both the number and importance
of those agents that the competitor could directly influence.
In fact, the KC of node i can be directly defined from IM as the influence of node
i on the whole network:
i ki
k V
KC f

 . (10)
The KC-based prediction criterion can be derived from the IM criterion by just
changing the order of summation and sign function in Eq. (7):
/{ , }
( ) ( ) ( )i j ij ki kj
k V i j
sgn KC KC sgn KC sgn f f

   , (11)
where iKC is the KC value of node i (For a directed network, we just need to add one
more term ( )ji ijf f in the sum). Directly summing up the influence errors in Eq. (11)
12
may help reduce perturbation, and thus result in more robust criterion. This might
explanation why KC criterion is better to predict the winner than the IM criterion.
PageRank is basically a variant of Katz centrality which is widely used for ranking
nodes in directed networks such as WWW29. Although IM criterion is not the best, an
advantage of IM criterion over node-centrality based criteria is that it could also
predict the bias of each normal agent, in addition to predict the winner.
Degree (DC) is certainly the simplest criterion to predict the winner. However, it is
a bit surprising to see that DC criterion provides as high as 80% success rate of
prediction and performs even better than criteria based on BC, KS and CC. This
implies that the number of agents that competitors could directly influence is still a
relatively important factor. On the other hand, CC turns out to be the poorest
criterion to predict the winner: the corresponding average success rate is just a little
bit better than that of the completely random guessing (33.3%). Note that CC of a
node captures how long it will take to spread information from the node to all other
nodes sequentially. Our results show that this score has little effect on the
competition.
(a)
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(b)
Figure 4 | The success rate of prediction of competition result on 8 real
undirected networks. Here we compare the IM criterion with 7 centrality-based
criteria. (a) the success rate of prediction for each network. (b) the average success
rate of prediction of each criterion over 8 networks.
(a)
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(b)
Figure 5 | The success rate of prediction of competition result on 7 real
directed networks. Here we compare the IM criterion with 7 centrality-based criteria.
(a) the success rate of prediction for each network. (b) the average success rate of
prediction of each criterion over 7 networks.
Discussion
In summary, we study a model of competitive dynamics in which two competitors
have fixed and different states, and each normal agent adjusts its state according to a
distributed consensus protocol. The steady states of normal agents are fully
determined by the network structure and positions of competitors in the network.
Although real world competition involves a number of complex factors, we find that
this very simple model can completely reveals the competition result in the well-
known Zachary’s karate club network. We investigate the Influence Matrix (IM)
criterion to predict which competitor a normal agent will support and which
competitor will win. We further compare the IM criterion with seven well-known node
centrality measures. We find that Katz centrality (KC) and PageRank (PR) provide
best prediction for undirected and directed networks, respectively.
These findings suggest that competitors in a network might use techniques such
as PageRank optimization30 to adjust network structure in order to win the
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competition. Although we assume that there are only two competitors in the model,
the above analysis can also be generalized to the case with two sets of competitors in
a network, and a nature way to deal with this case is to view all agents in a set as a
super-agent. However, a key challenge here is that there does not existing a simple
relationship between the sum of the centrality values of all agents in a set in the
original network and the centrality score of the super-agent in the new network. All
these issues will be considered in future work.
Methods
Theoretical analysis of the model. Eqs. (1)-(2) can be can be rewritten in the
following matrix form:
( 1) ( ) ( )= ( )NX t I H L X t TX t    , (12)
where NI is an identity matrix; L D A  is the Laplacian matrix, D is the diagonal
matrix of agents’ out-degrees; H is an indicative diagonal matrix with ( , ) 0H s s  if
agent s is a competitor, and ( , ) 1H s s  otherwise. Obviously, the sum of each row of
matrix T equals to 1.
For convenience, we reorder the agents so that the two competitors come last. Thus,
we have
0
0
i
j
D
D d
d
      
0 0
0
0
and 0 *
* 0
i j
i
j
A
A
      
c c
r
r
, (13)
where id and jd denote the out-degrees of competitor i and j , respectively; vectors
ic , jc , ir , and jr contain the corresponding elements in the reordered coupling
matrix.
Hence, Eq.(12) can be rewritten as
( 1) ( )
( 1) ( )1 0
( 1) ( )0 1
norm norm
i i
j j
X t X tQ B
x t x t
x t x t
                       
0
0
, (14)
where 2NnormX R  represents the state vector of all normal agents; 2 ( )NQ I D A  
and i jB     c c . Thus,
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1
0
( 1)( ) ( 1) ( 1)
(0)            (0) (0)
i
norm norm
j
t it k
norm
k j
x tX t QX t B x t
xQ X Q B x


      
     
(15)
If each normal agent has a path connecting to at least one competitor, then
2( ) ND A R   is invertible31. Since 1max0 D   , we can show from Geršgorin disk
theorem that the spectral radius of Q is less than 1. Thus, as t , we have
1
2
1
2 2
1
(0)( ) ( - ) (0)
(0)                 ( - ) (0)
1                 ( ) .1
i
norm N
j
i
N N i j
j
i j
xX t I Q B x
xI I D A x
D A
  



 

    
         
        
c c
c c
(16)
According to Lemma 4 in Ref. 32, each entry of 1( ) i jD A     c c is nonnegative
and each row sum of 1( ) i jD A     c c is equal to one. Thus, the steady state of each
normal agent is a convex combination of +1 and -1.
Computation of centrality measures. As in our definition of the network structure,
an link from agent k to agent l means agent k could be directly influenced by agent
l . Hence, for directed networks, we compute the centrality measures as follows
(which can be also applied to undirected networks):
In-BC33: the in-betweenness centrality of node l is computed by ( )( ) kmin
k m km
g lCB l g
 ,
where kmg is the number of geodesics from node k to node m and ( )kmg l is the
number of geodesics that node l is on;
In-CC34: the in-closeness centrality of node l is computed by 1( ) ( , )in k lCC l d k l ,
where ( , )d k l is the shortest distance from node k to node l ;
In-DC: the in-degree of a node is the number of agents that an agent could directly
influence;
In-EC21: the eigenvector centrality is a natural extension of degree by considering
both the number and the importance of those agents that an agent could directly
influence. The EC of a network is equal to the eigenvector corresponding to the
largest eigenvalue of the coupling matrix. According to the definition of the network
structure, we use TA to compute the In-EC;
In-KC: the Katz Centrality is a variation of EC, by adding an initial importance to each
agent. The In-Katz-Centrality of a network is computed by 1( )TI A  1 , where 1 is a
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vector with all ones of an appropriate size, and the attenuation factor. Related
studie35 shows that there is no significant change in ranking of nodes based on Katz
Centrality with 1 11 1[0.5 ,   0.9 )    . In simulations, we set 110.85   ;
In-KS36: nodes are assigned to different in-shells according to their remaining in-
degrees, which is obtained by successive pruning of nodes with in-degree smaller
than the current in-k-shell value. We start by removing all nodes with in-degree
1ink  , until that all nodes left are with in-degree larger than 1. The removed nodes,
along with the corresponding links, form an in-k-shell with index 1insk  . In a similar
fashion, we iteratively remove the next in-k-shell. As a result, each node is associated
with one insk index;
PageRank: the algebraic expression of the page rank can be formulated as
1 1 1( )TPR I A D N
     1 , where  is the dampening factor. We use the power
method37 to compute the page rank value, and set 0.85  . The Page Rank is a
variation on the Katz Centrality by dividing the importance of those agents which
could directly influenced by an agent, by their out-degrees.
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Figure Legends
Figure 1 | An example of how network structure influences the competition
result. (a) A simple undirected network of 10 agents with each edge of unit weight.
The competition between agent 1 and agent 10 ends up as draw. (b) The network is
derived from (a) by adding one edge between agent 2 and 6, which results in agent
10 being the winner. (c) The network has the same structure as network (a) but with
different edge weights, which leads to agent 1 being the winner.
Figure 2 | Verification of the model on Zachary’s karate club network. (a) Two
real communities in the network led by agent 1 and agent 34, respectively, as divided
by the dashed line in the figure. (b) Two communities derived from our model. Red
community consists of supporters of agent 1 and blue community consists of
supporters of agent 34. Darkness of the color represents the degree of supporting.
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Figure 3 | Application of the IM criterion to Zachary’s karate club network.
Agent 1 and agent 34 are two competitors. A normal agent is colored red (blue) if the
influence difference 1 34 0k kf f  ( 1 34 0k kf f  ). We dye all the nodes according to their
normalized difference. The darker the color the larger the absolute difference is.
Figure 4 | The success rate of prediction of competition result on 8 real
undirected networks. Here we compare the IM criterion with 7 centrality-based
criteria. (a) the success rate of prediction for each network. (b) the average success
rate of prediction of each criterion over 8 networks.
Figure 5 | The success rate of prediction of competition result on 7 real
directed networks. Here we compare the IM criterion with 7 centrality-based criteria.
(a) the success rate of prediction for each network. (b) the average success rate of
prediction of each criterion over 7 networks.
Table I | The average success rate of prediction of the IM criterion on 15 real
networks. For each network, we show its type and name; number of nodes (N) and
links (M) of the largest strongly connected component; the average success rate of
prediction on the bias of normal agents (   ) and the success rate of prediction on
who will win ( ).
Type Name N M   
Undirected ca-GrQc38 4158 13428 0.740 0.809
Undirected dolphin39 62 159 0.878 0.878
Undirected email40 1133 10902 0.847 0.888
Undirected facebook41 4039 88234 0.754 0.799
Undirected football42 115 4120 0.834 0.821
Undirected karate26 34 78 0.902 0.872
Undirected netsci43 379 1828 0.842 0.829
Undirected polbook44 105 441 0.821 0.853
Directed advogato45 3140 40066 0.818 0.832
Directed online46 1294 19026 0.897 0.917
Directed p2p47 2068 9313 0.847 0.870
Directed polblogs48 793 15781 0.853 0.929
Directed rado-email49 126 5639 0.916 0.969
Directed twitter50 1726 6901 0.781 0.800
Directed wiki51 1300 39456 0.816 0.841
